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 Globalizing Cosmologies 
Caroline Dodds Pennock and Amanda Power 
 
Few terms are as ubiquitous and yet as deceptive as ‘globalization’.1 Although historians 
quarrel over chronology and characteristics, it is conventionally understood to mean the 
specific historical process initiated by the European ‘discovery’ of the Americas in 1492, 
which culminated in our interconnected planet, our modernity. This is a modernity 
profoundly shaped by the demands and ideologies of capitalism, and so its history is traced 
principally through the movement of commodities and growth of markets.2 Methodological 
considerations, including perceived availability of source material, have reinforced the 
tendency among historians to prioritize such approaches.3 Thus, in the established narrative 
of intensifying ‘global’ integration, the ‘globalizing’ is done largely by Europeans and their 
                                               
1 For just a sample of terminological debates see Paul Bowles, ‘“Globalizing” Northern 
British Columbia: What's in a Word?’, Globalizations, 10.2 (2013), 261-76; and Nayef R.F. 
Al-Rodhan and Gérard Stoudmann, ‘Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive 
Overview and a Proposed Definition’, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Geneva, 2006). 
2 Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism: a longer view, 2nd edn (London, 2002).  
3 Works which (implicitly or explicitly) assume globalization to be synonymous with a 
‘world economy’ include: Jan de Vries, ‘The limits of globalization in the early modern 
world’, Economic History Review, 63.3 (2010), 710-33 and co-authored articles by Dennis 
O’Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, beginning with their ‘Born with a “Silver Spoon”: The Origin 
of World Trade in 1571’, Journal of World History, 6.2 (1995), 201-21. 
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empires; it is among them that the capacity for thinking and operating on a worldwide scale is 
concentrated, and their specific approaches and achievements are treated as archetypal. 
Communities and societies that are not seen as playing an active part in this particular process 
tend to be excluded by default: mere forerunners, spectators or victims of the progress of 
more advanced nations. Yet their exclusion does not seem to provoke doubt about whether 
the contemporary world is really ‘globalized’ or prompt reflection on whether employing the 
terminology of ‘the global’ is more ideologically driven than geographically accurate.4 
Despite multiple challenges to these Eurocentric biases, analysis continues to be dominated 
by a relatively stable, teleological and politicized understanding of the forms that 
‘globalizing’ thought and action can take.5 At stake in all this is a moralized discourse in 
                                               
4 Moyn and Sartori ask: ‘Even today are there not spaces on the earth that fall outside the 
networks of social life and intellectual circulation but whose inclusion is required for a truly 
global framework?... It may even be that the expansive space that is today called “the global” 
has never really existed’. ‘Approaches to Global Intellectual History’, in Samuel Moyn and 
Andrew Sartori (eds.), Global Intellectual History (New York, 2013), 5. The World Bank, for 
example, reported: ‘many poor countries - with about 2 billion people - have been left out of 
the process of globalization’. Globalization, growth, and poverty: building an inclusive world 
economy (New York, 2002), 2. Scholars, too, are content to conceive of ‘globalization’ that 
does not include the whole planet. See James Belich et al (eds.), The Prospect of Global 
History (Oxford, 2016), 3-5. 
5 Jerry H. Bentley, ‘Beyond Modernocentrism: Towards Fresh Visions of the Global Past’, in 
Victor H. Mair, Contact and Exchange in the Ancient World (Honolulu, 2006), 16-29. 
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which ‘globalization’ is seen as a marker of modernity, and in which the legitimacy of the 
current forms of the ‘global’ and the ‘modern’ resides partly in their conjunction, and partly 
in a strongly implied comparison with the ‘backwardness’ of other times and places. The vast 
majority of works of ‘global history’, regardless of whether they are Eurocentric or 
consciously provincialize Europe, choose starting dates that conform to conventional 
periodization and its embedded assumptions about the distinctive nature of different eras. 
Many pre-modern societies, such as our own Pre-Columbian and medieval6 European fields 
of interest (when they appear at all), thus find their place in larger historical narratives only as 
a source of evidence for ‘archaic’ or ‘proto’ globalization.7 Particular aspects of the past are 
selected for study precisely because they seem to indicate deep continuities in human 
ambition and activity. These approaches tend to obscure the fact that ‘modernity’ and the 
‘global’ are not fixed qualities residing only in the present, but are provisional and contingent 
ways of perceiving the world that have been, and remain, subject to perpetual redefinition 
according to the needs of different peoples and times. Scholars have generally lacked, 
                                               
6 ‘Medieval’ is used occasionally in this article - with reservations - for chronological 
comparability, not to suggest a particular mindset, ideology, or developmental stage. 
7 A.G. Hopkins, ‘Introduction: Globalization - An Agenda for Historians’, in his, 
Globalization in World History (London, 2002), 1-9. This discussion is largely limited to 
Eurasia, while existing historiography remains mysteriously silent on Pre-Columbian long-
distance networks. See, for example, Heather McKillop, ‘Ancient Maya Trading Ports and 
the Integration of Long-Distance and Regional Economies’, Ancient Mesoamerica, 7.1 
(1996), 49-62.  
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however, are approaches to recognizing and thinking about ‘global’ and ‘globalizing’ thought 
that can stand outside existing paradigms and dominant narratives. Our sense of what is 
‘global’ and ‘globalizing’ is thereby gravely impoverished, stripped of the richness and 
diversity that – one might fancy – should characterize a terminology designed to describe 
humanity and its environments in their totality, and the ways that these have been imagined 
over the millennia. 
 
In what follows, we contend that many communities and societies - whether conceived as 
pre-modern, indigenous,8 non-western, or otherwise subaltern to western modernity - 
possessed their own complex, sophisticated and dynamic ways of understanding the ‘global’ 
and envisaging themselves as ‘globalizing’ actors within it. These were not less creative, 
vivid, sophisticated or ambitious than our own; one could argue that they were in some ways 
more so. But historians working on such societies have tended to make cases for their 
inclusion within ‘global history’ in terms that speak to prevailing constructs, or simply accept 
their exclusion, rather than to seeking to challenge, reframe or even simply to improve, the 
                                               
8 We follow the UN’s ‘working definition’: ‘indigenous’ refers to cultures (or the ancestors 
thereof) ‘which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies 
that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the 
societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them.’ Douglas E. Sanders, 
‘Indigenous Peoples: Issues of Definition’, International Journal of Cultural Property, 8 
(1999), 6. Such groups frequently suffer economic, political and social disadvantage.  
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nature of these constructs.9 Instead of allowing the imperatives and values of a particular 
form of ‘globalization’ and its conception of the ‘global’ to determine the framework of 
research, we need to be asking far more important questions: what does it really mean to be 
‘global’ or to ‘globalize’? Why have societies thought in ‘global’ terms and why have they 
presented their activities as ‘globalizing’? These questions require a much broader enquiry 
into the many conceptions of the ‘global’ that have emerged in human societies, and how 
they have functioned in those societies and beyond. Our concept of ‘globalizing cosmologies’ 
offers a fresh approach to this problem, using the cases of Aztec Mexico and the late-
medieval Latin West (see Maps 1 and 2) as a lens through which to reimagine the global as a 
flexible and culturally specific concept, the precise understanding of which shifts through 
time and space without ever losing its imaginative power.  
 
In order to redefine such well-established paradigms of global history, we must first address 
the conceptual slippage that causes most scholars in the field to confuse specific 
characteristics with generic models. Frequently, it seems, we treat ‘our’ ways of imagining 
the ‘global’ and ‘globalizing’ as if they were universal categories of description and analysis 
which can be applied as analytic tools for the study of the past. This leads to a distorting 
focus on certain - often quite peripheral - aspects of the history of societies to which we are 
otherwise indifferent. It embeds the assumption that human societies will, or should, move 
                                               
9 E.g. Martin Pitts and Miguel John Versluys (eds.), Globalisation and the Roman World: 
World History, Connectivity and Material Culture (Cambridge, 2014); Nile Green, Terrains 
of Exchange: Religious Economies of Global Islam (London, 2014). 
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towards thinking and acting ‘globally’, that it is essentially the removal of obstacles and the 
acquisition of helpful technologies which enables this natural, inevitable step.10 Such 
assumptions obscure the considerable distinction between developing large-scale trade 
networks and viewing these as ‘global’ in their compass and significance; between engaging 
widely with the inhabitants of different regions and presenting that as a process of 
‘globalization’; and, indeed, between the capacity to think in ‘global’ terms and having the 
desire to act beyond one’s borders. The conceptual slippage arises, presumably, because we 
are all natives of our modernity and its ways of imagining the ‘global’. We are immersed in 
these subjectivities, these compellingly constructed rationalities and, perhaps, their 
shimmering promises for the future of ‘globalized’ humanity. At this moment in history, we 
inhabit teleology’s triumph and our whole way of life, including our professional activities, is 
deeply implicated in its praxis.  
 
To counter this tendency, it may be helpful to draw on the distinction made in anthropology 
between the ‘emic’ and the ‘etic’ perspective.11 Most histories of the global and globalization 
present themselves as taking an etic (external and notionally objective) perspective, but are in 
practice emic (culturally immersed insider) in their basic definitions. In other words, global 
                                               
10 See esp. Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the making of the 
modern world economy (Princeton, 2009). 
11 See Alan Barnard, ‘emic and etic’, in Alan Barnard and Jonathan Spencer (eds.), Routledge 
encyclopedia of social and cultural anthropology, 2nd edn. (London, 2010), 180-3; Daniel K. 
Richter, ‘Whose Indian History?’, William & Mary Quarterly, 50.2 (1993), 387-9.  
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histories are written by historians indigenous to our particular ‘globalized’ modernity, but are 
constructed to give the impression of detached scholarly objectivity, claiming to deal in 
universals when in fact they are doing the reverse. Such difficulties are hardly unique to the 
practice of global history, but they are particularly acute here because the problem extends to 
the most basic definition of what belongs to the field and what does not. Even explicit 
challenges to the Eurocentricity and modernocentricity of global history have tended to 
reinforce this slippage rather than exposing it. For example, Sanjay Subrahmanyam famously 
attempted to subvert Eurocentric developmental schema by using the notion of ‘connected 
histories’ to uncover the roots of ‘early modernity’ emerging organically in South Asian 
communities rather than being imposed by European encounter. His has been an important 
project: an influential attempt to recover active, intricate indigenous histories for South Asian 
societies. But even while overtly rejecting Eurocentric models, Subrahmanyam implicitly 
confirmed globalization (in its contemporary sense) as an essential quality of modernity. For 
Subrahmanyam, ‘modernity... is located in a series of historical processes that brought 
hitherto relatively isolated societies into contact, and we must seek its roots in a set of diverse 
phenomena - the Mongol dream of world conquest, European voyages of exploration, 
activities of Indian textile traders in the diaspora, the “globalization of microbes”...and so 
on’.12 Many of the characteristics of Subrahmanyam’s South Asian ‘early modernity’ mirror 
the attributes of a surprisingly conventional understanding of the origins of globalization. An 
autochtonous modernity might be a way of recentering global narratives on Asia, or even 
                                               
12 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘Hearing Voices: Vignettes of Early Modernity in South Asia, 
1400-1750’, Daedalus, 127.3 (1998), 100.  
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Africa, but what about the Americas and Australasia? By virtue of deriving from a field 
whose history may be fitted relatively neatly into conventional models of interconnectivity, 
Subrahmanyam’s work implicitly reinforces the exclusion of some other non-western 
societies from current understandings of ‘modernity’. Within this system of stable categories, 
even when one element is problematized, others are left uncontested, so that the essential 
structure remains in place. Only by recognizing and reimagining the ‘global’, and indeed, the 
activity of ‘globalization’, as emic concepts, the essences of which are transformed by their 
historical context, can we create a conceptual framework which provides space for medieval 
and non-western histories, or even for alternative perspectives on modern developments. It is 
not enough to find conventionally conceived, external, markers of global modernity on the 
margins, we must try to step outside our own embedded assumptions and view the ‘globe’ 
from ‘inside’ another reality. 
 
How, then, can the historian recognize and reconstruct a variety of ‘emic’ conceptions of ‘the 
global’ from an ‘etic’ standpoint? How can we overcome the pervasive sense that the ‘global’ 
is produced by tangible integration between particular (though not all) regions? If we 
recognize our view of ‘globalization’ as an ideology rather than a process,13 by what methods 
can we discover the strands of ‘globalizing’ thought in societies whose ambitions and scope 
for activity took a different form? There is a tendency to presume that medieval and 
                                               
13 For example, a more palatable synonym for economic and cultural colonization of the 
global south. Cf Vijay Prashad, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South 
(London, 2012). 
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premodern indigenous societies had a partial and incomplete knowledge of the globe, which - 
in stark contrast with early modern European societies, of which the same thing was true - 
precluded them from possessing ‘globalizing’ ambitions as they were unable to conceive of 
what we now know to be our whole planet, much less involve themselves in more than a 
small part of it. There is little doubt that these societies were generally aware of the limits of 
their information about the details of distant lands - more aware, in many ways, than we are 
of the limits of our own.14 Yet their epistemological priorities were such that this did not 
impact on their capacity to envision their environment on a cosmic scale, to assign meaning 
to it, and to see their societies as significant agents in global time and space. They did this - 
as we do ourselves but often without fully recognising it - by imbuing the earth with an 
existential coherence that accounted for the nature of life and humanity.15 We have called the 
product of this imaginative capacity a ‘globalizing cosmology’. By this we mean a 
cosmology - a complete view of heavens and earth - that enables a society to think about its 
place within a clearly envisioned ‘global’ context, to conceive of its actions in such terms 
                                               
14 A point made effectively, if polemically, in Noam Chomsky and Andre Vltchek, On 
Western Terrorism: From Hiroshima to Drone Warfare (Chicago, 2013). See also Denis 
Cosgrove on the way that western ‘global’ thinking has been dominated by carefully crafted 
imagery and propaganda. Apollo’s Eye: A Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the 
Western Imagination (Baltimore, 2001). 
15 See Denis Cosgrove, Geography and Vision: Seeing, Imagining and Representing the 
World (London, 2008). 
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and, in many cases, to legitimize political, social or economic agendas with reference to 
‘global’ processes. 
 
Our intention in this is not simply to redefine the ‘global’ as the world-view or oecumene of 
any given society, although we would certainly contend that the complexity and 
sophistication of indigenous and medieval world-views make them worthy of at least equal 
consideration with the ‘global’ thought of later periods. It seems likely that most, if not all, 
societies understand their environment in ways that produce a cosmology, but that does not 
make them ‘globalizing’; simply to have an understanding of the world is not necessarily to 
engage with that world. A ‘globalizing’ cosmology is typified by a process of engagement, in 
which the implications of the world-view translate to tangible activity. It might include origin 
or creation myths, divinities and other transcendent forces that affect the whole world, rather 
than just the specific portion of it in which the culture operates. It could be fundamental to 
identity: was the society connected, isolated, large, small, expanding, contracting; how was it 
to be ordered; what were the roles of women and men in this process; how should it relate to 
its neighbours? It might provoke or support expansionist, ‘globalizing’ or universalizing 
aspirations, or be explored and articulated through a creative dialogue between existing ideas 
and new ambitions.16 Within longer histories, it might well serve all these ends at different 
times, or at once, for different groups within society: there is no reason to assume 
                                               
16 It might also cause a society to refuse to engage in ‘globalizing’ behaviour or to reject 
opportunities to connect with other societies. 
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homogeneity or a unidirectional process of the kind usually envisaged as ‘globalization’ or 
something that necessarily engenders such a process. 
 
Often, such processes were experienced most profoundly during what might be called a 
‘globalizing moment’: a time when a society or elements within it consciously intensify their 
sense of themselves as global actors in order to achieve what might be relatively localized 
ends, or to disseminate their world-view more widely. The concept of ‘globalizing 
cosmologies’ is very broadly applicable, including to our own modernity, but in what follows 
we will explore it through an integrated comparison, principally, of ‘globalizing moments’ 
among the Aztecs and the thirteenth-century Latin West.17 In both cases, we have access to 
articulations of highly developed and sophisticated cosmologies, and are able to see 
something of the context in which they operated, their aims, and their intended audiences. 
Medieval and indigenous societies can be investigated as entities confident in their ‘global’ 
framework and possessing a harmonious sense of their cosmos; a totality of vision which 
grew out of and facilitated social and political action. This is an important subversion of 
narratives which tend to see the indigenous inhabitants of Africa, the Americas, Australasia 
and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Asia, as ‘recipients’ of globalization, victims and subjects of 
the oppressive forces which inevitably accompanied colonization. The global history of these 
                                               
17 Here understood as the parts of westernmost Eurasia in which the authority of the Roman 
church was acknowledged. See Tim Geelhaar, ‘Talking About christianitas at the Time of 
Innocent III (1198–1216): What Does Word Use Contribute to the History of Concepts?’, 
Contributions to the History of Concepts, 10.2 (2015), 7-28. 
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societies was not merely ‘a response, on a global scale, to the shocks set off by the Iberian 
initiatives’.18 If anything, many cultures possessed more powerful global ambitions before 
1492, when their global imagination was unhindered by European hegemonies and 
categories.  
 
The Aztec (or, more properly, Mexica) people of Tenochtitlan who dominated Central 
Mexico in the 1400s are a prime example of the ways in which a ‘globalizing cosmology’ can 
be deliberately constructed and actively experienced. They thought in ‘global’ terms and 
operated within a framework which was consciously designed to embrace and transform 
every aspect of the world, known and unknown. The Aztecs were only too aware of the 
limitations of their geographical knowledge: the world was cem-anahuac, the place 
surrounded by water, a universe bounded on the horizontal plane by the ilhuicaatl (‘water 
which reaches the heavens’), these great oceans forming a perfect orb (it is tempting to say, 
‘globe’).19 Perpendicular to the terrestrial world (Tlalticpac, the earth, ‘on the land’), the 
vertical plane reached below to the nine underworlds of Mictlan and above through the 
multiple, probably thirteen, heavens. Importantly, this belief structure blended the 
                                               
18 Serge Gruzinski, The Eagle & the Dragon: Globalization and European Dreams of 
Conquest in China and America in the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge, 2014), 3. 
19 Bernardino de Sahagún, Florentine Codex, General History of the Things of New Spain, 
trans. and eds. Charles E. Dibble and Arthur J.O. Anderson, 12 books in 13 vols, 2nd edn 
(Santa Fe, 1950-82), 11: 12: 247. Hereafter Florentine Codex. References are given as book: 
chapter: page number. 
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metaphysical with the earthly. One passed through the lower levels of the clouds, moon, sun, 
stars and planets, before reaching the gods and finally Omeyocan, the place of duality, the 
extreme edge of the known universe. The physical nature of these celestial realms is clear in 
Aztec thought: the gods lived not in a different dimension, but merely on a higher level. 
Similarly, Mictlan, the land of the dead below, was a dark, cold and damp place, foul for 
inhabitants, but much like the soil of the fertile earth. Spirits trying to reach Mictlan had to 
undertake an exhausting four-year journey to reach the lowest, ninth, level.20 The Aztecs’ 
global universe encompassed both the spiritual and the physical. Ometeotl, the transcendental 
god of duality, lived not only in Omeyocan but also (in his identity as Huehueteotl, the Old 
God) ‘on the navel of the earth, within the circle of turquoise’: at the apex of the universe, 
and also at its axis.21 The Aztecs’ island capital of Tenochtitlan, surrounded by water like the 
world itself, was a deliberate microcosm of this world-view, and its physical and 
metaphorical focus was the Templo Mayor (Great Temple), which tangibly linked local and 
global concerns.  
 
The universal scope of the Aztec cosmos is clear and, in its ambition to reach beyond the 
mundane and encompass all aspects of the world, it is inherently ‘globalizing’. In studies of 
indigenous, particularly Mesoamerican, cultures, this type of world-view is frequently 
                                               
20 Eduardo Matos Moctezuma, ‘Symbolism of the Templo Mayor’, in Boone (ed.), Aztec 
Templo Mayor, 186-9.  
21 Florentine Codex, quoted in Miguel León-Portilla, Aztec Thought and Culture, trans. J.E. 
Davis (Norman, 1963), 32. 
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referred to as a ‘cosmovision’. Borrowed from Spanish (cosmovisión), this term refers to ‘the 
ways in which cultures combine their cosmological notions relating to time and space into a 
structural and systematic whole’.22 The cosmovision is more than the world-view in that it 
engages directly with how belief and practice are integrated: this is a way of viewing, 
structuring, understanding, and engaging with the world through cosmology (in its 
anthropological sense, as a coherent vision of an ordered universe). Inherently driven by 
praxis, the cosmovision is a reciprocal structure, binding together a society’s multiple 
ideologies and activities, in which the physical and spiritual worlds are harmoniously and 
purposefully integrated. 
 
One of the difficulties in trying to establish the ‘globalizing’ nature of cosmology is that 
cultures and ideologies can be frustratingly complex, shifting and intangible - a contributing 
factor, no doubt, to the tendency of scholars to focus on trade and commodities as a way to 
trace ‘global’ networks. This situation is compounded in the pre-modern world by the 
elusiveness of medieval and Pre-Columbian belief, especially in the almost limitless realms 
of individual experience. The scarcity of sources for Mesoamerican culture is well known; 
the rich indigenous pictorial record was largely destroyed in the aftermath of the European 
invasions and post-conquest alphabetic documents tend, inevitably, to capture a static and 
monolithic picture. Dominated by elite perspectives, these early ‘codices’ are an invaluable, 
                                               
22 Davíd Carrasco, Religions of Mesoamerica (Long Grove, 2014), 69.  
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but highly problematic, source for Mexica belief and practice.23 But the coherence of Aztec 
thought is not merely a standardized figment of the early colonial imagination. Operating on 
a smaller scale than the vast regions that acknowledged the authority of the Roman church, 
the Aztecs were able to effectively impose a dominant ideology which was remarkable for its 
coherent synthesis of the terrestrial, metaphysical, political and spiritual realms. History and 
myth were mirrored in ritual and urban planning, while humans were constrained by not only 
natural and divine forces, but also the expectations of historic and calendrical cycles. And, as 
we will demonstrate, this complex and fatalistic cosmology was no mere idealized model, but 
a strategic means of structuring the Aztecs’ ‘global’ vision at a particular moment, promoting 
and validating their imperial agenda.24 This was not the immutable and homogenized world-
view which is sometimes presented as typifying non-modern cultures; the Aztec cosmovision 
was a dynamic structure in which the relationship between individuals and the world was 
constantly reinvented. This active dialogue between ideology and practice is fundamental to 
our conception of a ‘globalizing cosmology’; the interpretative force of the ‘global’ lies not in 
its etic structural significance as a theoretical mechanism of history, but in the flexible ways it 
can influence and help to articulate a society’s understandings of its actions within the 
metaphysical world. As we shall see, Latin Christendom also had a richly imagined cosmos, 
                                               
23 Caroline Dodds Pennock, Bonds of Blood: Gender, Lifecycle and Sacrifice in Aztec 
Culture (Basingstoke, 2008), 3-9. 
24 Johanna Broda, ‘The Provenience of the Offerings: Tribute and Cosmovisión’, in Elizabeth 
Hill Boone (ed.), The Aztec Templo Mayor: A Symposium at Dumbarton Oaks, 8th and 9th 
October 1983 (Dumbarton Oaks, 1987), 211-56. 
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in which the temporal and spiritual realms were closely entwined. Significantly, however, the 
Aztecs were acting principally within the relatively discrete setting of Tenochtitlan and its 
surrounds - their sphere of influence had a single clearly identified centre, and there seems to 
have been relatively little dispute regarding the essentials of their world-view, although there 
was naturally variation of belief and practice across the empire. The colonial sources - largely 
recorded by Spanish missionaries informed by male survivors of the indigenous nobility - 
almost certainly overemphasize the apparent consensus of belief; but a universal education 
system, effective administrative and religious centralization meant that the Tenochca were 
able to create a coherent and widely shared world-view which could shape Aztec actions and 
be actively promoted in their subject territories. 
 
In contrast to Mesoamerica, there is, of course, a remarkably rich survival of documentary 
and material evidence from medieval Europe. The bulk of it was produced by a relatively 
narrow group of elite males with a shared interest in ensuring continuities in authority and 
ideology over the centuries, crafting what has often been described as the ‘medieval world-
view’. More recently, historians have recognised the indeterminacy, variation and 
subjectivities that it obscured. We should therefore see local identities as existing in dialogue 
with cosmologies that invested immediate concerns with larger resonances. This means that 
the cosmologies themselves should be understood as dynamic, contested, flexible and 
purposeful rather than, as formerly, as inert representations, or mere curations, of an 
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oecumene whose outlines had been laid down centuries before.25 Even if cosmologies were 
largely constructed and promulgated by members of elites among a population conditioned 
broadly to accept ecclesiastical pronouncements, they had to be meaningful to their 
recipients, and adaptable enough to gain traction in a variety of shifting situations, to survive 
challenge, resistance and rejection. 
 
To see how these ideas worked in the Latin west as ‘globalizing’ cosmographies, it is 
necessary to look beyond the sources that are usually deployed to understand ‘world-views’: 
predominantly geographical materials and travel narratives. There is, in this period, no 
shortage of material for a historian looking to find traces of ‘proto-globalization’; this is, 
indeed, the general tenor in studies of such sources. But that is to impose a teleology and 
embed values that would have meant very little to the people concerned. The ‘globalizing’ 
character of medieval Latin thought was not a product of the accumulation of information 
about the world and its opportunities, but emerged with changes in the dynamics of power 
and social order. Much of the meaning of human existence was located beyond an 
individual’s palpable environment, beyond the merely factual: within a richly imagined, fluid, 
‘global’ time and space. 
 
                                               
25 See J. B. Harley and David Woodward (eds.), Cartography in Prehistoric, Ancient, and 
Medieval Europe and the Mediterranean, vol. 1, The History of Cartography (6 vols. 
Chicago, 1987-), esp. 506-9. 
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All life was lived below the turning heavens that encircled the sphere of the world, and the 
movements of planets, stars and comets, so much more intimately known in an age of dark 
nights, were believed to determine terrestrial life in tangible ways.26 The instabilities of 
environment and fortune were potentially negotiable through relics, amulets, charms, prayers, 
penances and pilgrimages that drew on forces beyond the merely human.27 These ways of 
understanding the relations of heavens and earth, and between humanity, nature and fate 
show an imagination at work that was already ‘globalized’, in the sense that the causative 
powers of the cosmos, and human strategies within them, were seen as operating on a 
‘global’ scale, and meaningful precisely because of this. In more tangible terms, too, the local 
was imbued with ‘global’ significance. The produce of the farmed earth paid tax and tithe, 
linking labour to systems of governance, law and pastoral care, to the luxury trades, politics 
and wars of the secular and ecclesiastical elites. Such connections extended far beyond the 
knowledge of any individual: they were a multitude of fragile links – commercial, military, 
diplomatic, devotional, evangelical – that ran to distant parts of the world. Formal doctrine, 
part of basic education, was transmitted orally and widely depicted in material culture, 
disseminating official cosmologies, rendering them continuously active, forming the minds 
and perceptions of new generations of the faithful.28 Past, present and future, as well as 
                                               
26 Colum Hourihane (ed.), Time in the Medieval World: Occupations of the Months & Signs 
of the Zodiac in the Index of Christian Art (Princeton, 2007). 
27 Don C. Skemer, Binding Words: Textual Amulets in the Middle Ages (Pennsylvania, 2006). 
28 Norman Tanner and Sethina Watson, ‘The least of the laity: the minimum requirements for 
a medieval Christian’, Journal of Medieval History, 32.4 (2006), 395-423. 
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authority, were envisaged on an explicitly planetary scale. The population learned that the 
first humans had been born in Eden [Gen 2.8], often marked on maps at the easternmost rim 
of the world’s circle. There, the harmony of creation was ruptured by the first great sin of 
disobedience. Afterwards, humans - now mortal and doomed to suffering - multiplied and 
spread through the lands. Later, in Jerusalem, ‘set in the centre of the nations, with countries 
all around her’ [Ez 5.5], the death and resurrection of Christ restored the possibility of 
forgiveness and eternal life. It was from Jerusalem, the navel of the world, that the apostles 
travelled to the ends of the earth to bring the hope of redemption to all people. All these far-
reaching episodes were physically located, and were enduringly resonant through time, filling 
the globe and infusing it with the fundamental truths and imperatives of the cosmos itself.  
 
The apostles, with their explicitly global compass, became the archetype of the two forms of 
holy authority in medieval society.29 One was vested through succession in the Apostolic See 
of Rome: the highest spiritual power in the world, with the right to bind and to loose all 
human souls [Matt 18.18]. The other was palpable in the fierce sanctity of individual women 
and men, whose devout lives and virtuous deaths brought ordinary people closer to God. 
These manifestations of ‘apostolic’ authority were widely and explicitly exercised: and 
always carried with them ‘global’ and ‘globalizing’ power. Secular rulers, too, drew on a 
sense of divinely mandated power that transcended mere territorial dominion.30 It was as 
                                               
29 See Matt. 28. 18-20. 
30 See Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political 
Theology (Princeton, 1957). 
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God’s temporal representatives that lay and religious elites alike framed demands for 
obedience from the population. Of crucial importance to this system was the promise to the 
population that the harsh inequalities and injustices of daily life would be remedied after 
death, obedience rewarded and sin and dissent punished. For the fulfilment  of these 
promises, the globe was permeated by the strange and shadowy afterlife experienced by 
mortal souls awaiting this final judgement. As the Aztec teyolia (spirits of ‘divine fire’ 
animating the body) lingered in Mictlan, for the damned soul in the Latin West there was 
suffocating enclosure at the planet’s fiery heart; for the contrite soul: purgation, variously 
located, but often in caverns running beneath the earth’s surface, or at the antipodes. The 
redeemed soul might await the end of time in the earthly paradise of the east, or ascend to its 
maker through the planets and stars, observing the whole globe from afar and understanding 
the triviality of all human affairs.31 This tangle of ideas layered a higher reality, as 
imperceptible to living eyes as the terrible power of God, over the contours of the temporal 
sphere. The whole globe, then, belonged within these complex constructions of religious, 
social and political meaning, and there was no space for rival understandings of the cosmos. 
These were just some of the elements that historians have tended to see as a relatively static 
‘world-view’, but which were in practice meaningful precisely because they were constantly 
being reshaped and deployed to serve immediate and local needs. Praxis was a perpetual and 
necessary element in the maintenance of the whole conceptual structure. Without regular 
                                               
31 Eileen Gardiner, ‘Hell, Purgatory and Heaven’, in Albrecht Classen (ed.), Handbook of 
medieval culture: fundamental aspects and conditions of the European Middle Ages (Berlin, 
2015), 653-73. 
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engagement and articulation, the force of these globalizing cosmologies would have faltered 
and been forgotten. 
 
The Aztecs also rooted claims to ‘global’ authority in the layering of historic and spiritual 
power, establishing a metropolis which reflected and controlled the cosmos, and was 
‘globalizing’ in both ambition and conception. Their great pyramid, with its twin temples of 
Tlaloc (water and fertility) and Huitzilopochtli (war and the sun) at the summit, not only 
represented the fundamentals of Aztec existence, but was also the axis of the terrestrial and 
celestial planes. Through this sacred mountain the Aztecs related the practical, politics and 
economics, (structure) with their ideology (superstructure).32 In Aztec origin stories, 
Huitzilopochtli, god of war, and the patron god of the Aztecs, was gloriously born and 
immediately triumphed over his sister Coyolxauhqui and her forces at the summit of 
Coatepec (Snake Mountain). The Templo Mayor, adorned with serpents, symbolized 
Coatepec: the physical, historical and spiritual site of Aztec power. Huitzilopochtli’s seminal 
victory was re-enacted during every sacrificial ritual: just as the dismembered pieces of 
Coyolxauhqui tumbled from the mountain peak, so the corpses of sacrificial victims were 
thrown from the temple summit, falling to rest near the huge Coyolxauhqui Stone which 
showed the broken pieces of the goddess [see Fig. 3]. Through the constant ritual reiteration 
of Huitzilopochtli’s first victory, the Templo Mayor was born and reborn as both the 
birthplace of the state and the centre of the cosmological universe. Lying at the heart of the 
                                               
32 Eduardo Matos Moctezuma, 'Archaeology & Symbolism in Aztec Mexico: The Templo 
Mayor of Tenochtitlan’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 53.4 (1985), 800.  
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earthly plane of cem-anahuac, and acting as the nexus of the different layers of existence, the 
Templo Mayor was ‘the root, the navel, and the heart of all the world order’.33 Much as 
Jerusalem was placed conceptually and cartographically at the centre of medieval Christian 
conceptions of the world [see Fig. 1], Aztec symbolic geographies framed Tenochtitlan as the 
centre of the universe. As one evocative Nahuatl song declared: ‘Who could conquer 
Tenochtitlan? Who could shake the foundation of heaven?’34  
 
                                               
33 Diego Durán, The History of the Indies of New Spain, trans. and ed. Doris Heyden 
(Norman, 1994), 337. 
34 Cantares Mexicanos, fol. 19v, translated in Miguel León-Portilla, Pre-Columbian 
Literatures of Mexico (Norman, 1986), 77.  
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Fig. 3. Drawing by Emily Umberger of the 3.25m diameter Coyolxauhqui Stone, now in the 
Museo del Templo Mayor, Mexico. I am indebted to Emily Umberger for providing the 
image and for her permission to reproduce it. 
 
The mapping of the cosmic order onto physical space is not a new idea. Such symbolic 
geography is frequently observed in pre-modern cities and scholars have made much of the 
‘pervasive tendency to dramatize the cosmogony [origin or creation of the universe] by 
constructing on earth a reduced version of the cosmos, usually in the form of a state 
capital’.35 But although such ‘exemplary centres’,36 where the macrocosmos of the universe is 
patterned onto the microcosmos of the city, are widely recognized, the function of these 
spaces tends to be presented as an inevitable product of the ‘archaic mentality’. In this model, 
superstitious, ‘archaic’ man accepts the sacred view of the world without question; it is 
timeless, unchanging and eternal. Eliade goes so far as to say that ‘for archaic man, reality is 
a function of the imitation of a celestial archetype’.37  
 
                                               
35 Paul Wheatley, City as Symbol: An Inaugural Lecture delivered at University College, 
London, 20 November 1967 (London, 1967), 10. 
36 Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre-State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton, 1980), 
13.  
37 Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. W. R. Trask 
(New York, 1959), 5.  
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But although the Aztecs certainly viewed their world through a sacred lens, bolstering their 
claims to authority through the ritual re-enactment of mytho-historical38 precedents, this did 
not produce retrospection, but rather ambition. The framing of Tenochtitlan as axis mundi 
and its inhabitants as predestined rulers was no accidental rationalization of imperial power; 
it was deliberately constructed (or at least reimagined) in 1431 when the city of Tenochtitlan 
was rising to power as part of the so-called Triple Alliance. At this time, the tlatoani (ruler) 
Itzcoatl ordered that all existing records be destroyed and a new official history be written to 
avoid the spreading of ‘sorcery’ and ‘falsehoods’ which might lead the ‘government to be 
defamed’.39 This deliberate rewriting of history, occurring at a moment of transition, shows 
the Aztecs consciously deploying a globalizing cosmology to shape and direct their imperial 
aspirations. Some time after Huitzilopochtli’s victory over Coyolxauhqui, he is said to have 
miraculously ordained the Aztecs’ future settlement at a place called Tenochtitlan, which 
would be recognized ‘as the supreme capital’ and ‘rule over all others in the country’. Their 
future as warrior rulers was clear; as the priest Cuauhtlequetzqui proclaimed: ‘The might of 
our arms will be known and the courage of our brave hearts. With these we shall conquer 
                                               
38 ‘Mythical-history’ is an established term which acknowledges that there is no real value in 
trying to distinguish ‘facts’ from ‘myth in these richly layered cyclical histories. Susan D. 
Gillespie, The Aztec kings: the construction of rulership in Mexica history (Tucson, 1989) 
pp.xi-xxvii. 
39 Florentine Codex, 10: 29: 191.  
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nations, near and distant, we shall subdue towns and cities from sea to sea.’40 This is no 
ethereal notion of sacred space, but a tangible and carefully conceived motivation for, and 
justification of, territorial dominance: of terrestrial and conceptual ‘globalization’.  
 
By 1521, when the Aztec capital finally fell to the Spanish conquistadors, Tenochtitlan’s 
sphere of influence embraced some 200,000 square kilometres with a population of five or 
six million.41 The disparate borders of this hegemonic empire, comprising both subject and 
allied cities, required careful management, and military and political strategies were 
complemented by a cosmology designed to secure the Aztecs’ territorial position, physically 
and metaphysically. The ongoing excavations of the Templo Mayor demonstrate the process 
of ‘cosmological incorporation’ through which Tenochtitlan sought to secure its influence 
over subject and allied cities. Of the over 7,000 ritual objects unearthed from 131 burial 
caches over 80 per cent came from the imperial borderlands, including from areas of political 
volatility. It seems that ‘the Aztecs were making special efforts to gather and integrate the 
objects of peripheral cities and places into their city’s center… In this way, the social and 
                                               
40 Diego Durán, The History of the Indies of New Spain, trans and ed. Doris Heyden 
(Norman, 1994), 42-3.  
41 Elizabeth M. Brumfiel, ‘Aztec hearts and minds: religion and the state in the Aztec 
empire’, in Susan E. Alcock et al, Empires: Perspectives from Archaeology and History 
(Cambridge, 2001), 284.  
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natural habitats of peripheral communities were symbolically contained at the axis mundi.’42 
This is an exemplary demonstration of Tenochtitlan’s influence over its subject empire, but it 
was also a globalizing process, a tangible means of extending Aztec control. The Templo 
Mayor (and arguably the city as a whole) was not only the cosmos in miniature, but also the 
empire.43 
 
Folio 2r of the Codex Mendoza, the archetypal image of the Tenochtitlan-centred cosmology, 
represents this imperial and globalizing narrative [see Fig. 4].44 The eagle alighting on the 
cactus recalls Aztec foundation stories, while also forming part of the Tenochtitlan glyph (the 
rock, tetl, below the nochtli, cactus) which sits above the shield and darts or arrows which are 
a metaphor for war and represent the city’s warrior nature and origins. The page evokes not 
only the physical layout of the city’s calpulli districts and its location at the heart of the lake, 
displaying the political structure through its founding dynasties, but also evokes the universe: 
Tenochtitlan sits at the heart of the four cardinal regions; Huitzilopochtli is suggested by the 
eagle, associated with the sun; and the whole is enclosed by waters, just as the world itself. 
But the account of the Tenochca past which appears at the base of the page and in the folios 
which follow, juxtaposes a political narrative with this metaphysical view; conquests are 
                                               
42 Davíd Carrasco, City of Sacrifice: The Aztec Empire and the Role of Violence in 
Civilization (Boston, 1999), 69, 54, 67. 
43 Emily Umberger, ‘Art and Imperial Strategy in Tenochtitlan’, in Frances F. Berdan et al 
(eds.), Aztec Imperial Strategies (Dumbarton Oaks, 1996), 85-106. 
44 This approach was inspired by Carrasco, City of Sacrifice, 40-3. 
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privileged over more domestic issues such as royal inaugurations, marriages, and natural 
disasters.45 Through this complete and layered cosmology, Tenochtitlan expressed a clear 
vision of itself at a heart of a spiritual, but also highly political, universe. The harmonious 
ideal of the exemplary city is challenged by the competition on its borders; Tenochtitlan’s 
globalizing cosmology was driven by both politics and principles. 
 
                                               
45 See Frances Berdan and Patricia Reiff Anawalt (eds.), The Codex Mendoza, 4 vols. 
(Berkeley, 1992), ii, esp. 3-7. 
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Fig. 4. Folio 2r from The Codex Mendoza. Copyright: Bodleian Library, Oxford 
 
While elements in Christian and Muslim thought could inspire proselytizing activities, the 
Aztecs’ distinctive cosmology was not universalizing. In Tenochtitlan, communal survival 
rested on the ability to manipulate power dynamics or ‘flows of energy’ within the existing 
cosmic structure, in which everyone and everything had their place. Failure to pay their 
‘blood debt’ to the gods would result in a catastrophic collapse of the order of the universe, 
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but at the same time the natural order had to be respected. Thus, although the conquest of 
‘foreign’ gods was central to the Aztec strategic need to acquire captives for sacrifice - the 
pictoglyph for a defeated town is a toppled and burning temple [see Fig. 3] - these deities and 
their followers remained an inextricable part of the Aztecs’ thought world. In this ‘power-
filled cosmos of motion’, one could not destroy an alternate ‘cosmic centre’, in the form of a 
rival city, without upsetting the natural balance.46 Even enemies had to be incorporated into 
the cosmology. This can help explain not only the innately globalizing nature of the Mexica 
thought world, but also the specific form of their globalizing ambitions: a hegemonic rather 
than a territorial empire. This was a truly ‘global’ cosmos, a view which saw every part of the 
world, physical, spiritual, and natural, individual and communal, as interdependent. 
 
The medieval Hindu-Buddhist states of Southeast Asia provide a comparable example of ‘a 
pre-modern totalizing construct in which social, religious, and cosmological orders were 
integrally linked’.47 Based on a mandala structure of power radiating outward from diffuse 
centres, these states have been dubbed ‘galactic polities’ by Tambiah, who importantly 
emphasizes the ways in which sacred ideologies were inextricable from the secular rather 
                                               
46 Kay Read, ‘Sacred Commoners: The Motion of Cosmic Powers in Mexica Rulership’, 
History of Religions, 34.1 (1994), esp. 60-1, 64.  
47 Juliane Schober, ‘The Theravāda Buddhist Engagement with Modernity in Southeast Asia: 
Whither the Social Paradigm of the Galactic Polity?’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 
26.2 (1995), 309.  
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than superseding them.48 Resisting the tendency to archaize pre-modern cultures, Tambiah 
presents Thai kingdoms such as Sukhothai and and Ayutthaya (Map 5) as ‘pulsating’ states 
which were flexible and dynamic enough to cope with the inherent paradoxes and 
contradictions of the politico-economic reality. The fluidity of these kingdoms is evident in 
the fact that the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century rulers of Sukhothai balanced the model of 
an exemplary capital with the reality of ‘a moving center of improvised bamboo palaces, and 
field camps of the warrior king’.49 During this period of instability, the cosmological model 
was deliberately deployed as a ‘globalizing’ strategy to solidify theoretical power which was 
tenuous in reality. The expansion and elaboration of the Templo Mayor at pivotal junctures 
for the empire suggests a similar connection in Tenochtitlan between the desire to establish 
strength at precarious moments and the promotion of the globalizing cosmology.50 Much 
discussion of the temple as a compelling site of state power focuses on the ways in which the 
                                               
48 S.J. Tambiah, World Renouncer & World Conqueror: A Study of Buddhism and and Polity 
in Thailand against a Historical Background (Cambridge, 1976), esp. 102-31; Cf ‘solar 
polities’, based on the analogy of the  diminishing gravitational pull of the sun. Victor 
Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, Volume 1, Integration on 
the Mainland (Cambridge, 2003), 33. 
49 Stanley Jeyeraja Tambiah, ‘The galactic polity in Southeast Asia’, HAU: Journal of 
Ethnographic Theory, 3 (2013), 527-8, 511. 
50 Richard F. Townsend, ‘Coronation at Tenochtitlan’, in Boone (ed.), Aztec Templo Mayor, 
371-410.  
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notorious human-sacrificial cult was used to promote elite power over the unfortunate 
masses,51 but its messages were also directed further afield. 
 
The paradigm of the exemplary centre is seductive, an idealized model in which cosmos, state 
and individual are intertwined and mirrored, the city or state a perfect miniature of the 
supernatural order. But it tends to shift our focus to the centre rather than the periphery. Paul 
Wheatley characterized early urban centres as principally ‘ceremonial 
complexes…instruments for the creation of political, social, economic and sacred space, at 
the same time as they were symbols of cosmic, social and moral order’. He rightly highlights 
the secular as well as sacred connotations of such structures, and the ways in which they 
functioned as ‘nodes in a web of administered (gift and treaty) trade’, but again tends to allow 
the ‘all-pervading religious context’ of these ‘brittle, pyramidal societies’ to overshadow 
what we have chosen to call the ‘global’ context.52 Tenochtitlan was not merely an ‘[island] 
of sacred symbolism in the intrinsically hostile continuum of profane space’,53 adrift in an 
ocean of unknown threats; it was an active presence at the heart of a complex web of 
influences.  
                                               
51 John M. Ingham, ‘Human Sacrifice at Tenochtitlan’, Comparative Studies in Society in 
History, 26.3 (1984), 379-400.  
52 Paul Wheatley, The Pivot of the Four Quarters: a Preliminary Enquiry into the Origins 
and Character of the Ancient Chinese City (Edinburgh, 1971), 225-6. 
53 Paul Wheatley, City as Symbol: An Inaugural Lecture delivered at University College, 
London, 20 November 1967 (London, 1967), 26. 
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This is not to dismiss religious structures and interpretations; both the Aztec and medieval 
European worlds were profoundly shaped by metaphysical forces. Rather, we suggest a shift 
in both emphasis and approach. The tendency in scholarship is to see pre-modern and non-
western cosmologies as part of an ‘archaic’ way of understanding the world, fundamentally 
distinct from ‘modern’, rational, ways of thinking and seeing. But, as Meinig wrote about 
twentieth-century New England: ‘Every mature nation has its symbolic landscapes.’54 Padrón 
suggests: ‘Modernity naturalizes geometric, optical, isotropic space as a fundamental 
epistemological category’,55 privileging empiricist and literal representations of the world, 
and this has tended to obscure the necessarily symbolic nature of contemporary 
cosmographies and cartographies. A fiction of completeness underpins the universalizing 
claims of modern globalization: we know the whole world and therefore it can be controlled 
and connected. But even the most ‘scientific’ modern representations of the globe are 
impacted by choices which reflect not only practical constraints but also political agendas. 
The standard map of the world has long been a subject of controversy for its Eurocentric 
representation, which reflects the preconceptions and preoccupations of its sixteenth-century 
Flemish designer Mercator. For him, Europe was the centre of the world and the requirements 
                                               
54 D.W. Meinig, ‘Symbolic Landscapes: Some idealizations of American communities’, in 
D.W. Meinig (ed.), The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essays 
(Oxford, 1979), 164.  
55 Ricardo Padrón, The Spacious Word: Cartography, Literature, and Empire in Early 
Modern Spain (Chicago, 2004), 39. 
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of European navigators his prime concern. Just as Aztec representations of Tenochtitlan 
operated to promote their ascendancy, one could argue that the Mercator Projection promotes 
European dominance over the globe. But this is just the best-known example of the 
continuing importance of symbolic cartographies, for all rectangular projections inevitably 
distort the ‘reality’ of the globe which they pretend to portray. Rather than seeing spiritual 
and metaphysical ways of interpreting the world as part of archaic, superstitious narratives of 
‘pre-modernity’, we need to recognize them as part of a more ambitious narrative of global 
space, explicitly rejecting models which tempt us to draw an arbitrary line between archaic 
and modern modes of thought and articulation. 
 
Latin Christian thinking drew on a body of diverse ideas that had, as we have seen, extremely 
pronounced ‘globalizing’ tendencies. These could be left latent, or woven into larger social 
imaginaries, as required by local and immediate agendas or longer-term framings of proper 
Christian activity.56 As a ‘globalizing’ imperative was so closely connected with the 
conceptualization and assertion of authority, it tended to be emphasized in situations where 
the nature, legitimacy and workings of power were at stake. One manifestation of this was the 
employment of eschatological language to emphasise the urgency of threats to the faithful, 
making it possible to invest even quite localized disputes and ambitions with cosmic 
implications, and periodically harnessed, rather as ‘security’ concerns are today, to give 
institutions and individuals a high responsibility and correspondingly enhanced powers. Such 
                                               
56 On ‘social imaginary’, see Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC, 
2004). 
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tendencies were particularly palpable in the heartlands of the Latin West from the eleventh 
century.57 They are perceptible in justifications for the rapid development of centralized 
ecclesiastical governance and jurisprudence, together with parallel developments in secular 
governance and systems of ‘pastoral care’ that brought the Christian inhabitants of the Latin 
West under regular clerical scrutiny and discipline.58 The population was able to participate 
more actively in this cosmology through involvement in crusades and other penitential 
activities that connected individuals to the wider community. There was hunger among the 
laity for new forms of holiness that might renew and re-evangelize the world in its final age. 
Thus, economies, modes of governance, military ideologies, education, public ritual and 
display, and the direction of spiritual life drew energy and moral force from their location 
within a decidedly ‘global’ conception of past, present and future. It is in this far-ranging new 
dynamism that the employment of many strands of ‘globalizing cosmology’ can be detected.  
 
One example of how it operated can be found in the response to the Mongol onslaught on 
Hungary and Poland in 1241-2. In conventional narratives of globalization, this was 
significant because it created the conditions for Europe to enter Eurasian networks of trade 
                                               
57 Traditionally understood by historians through paradigms of ‘reform’. See Gerd 
Tellenbach, The Church in Western Europe from the Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century 
(Cambridge, 1993).  
58 Lateran IV, constitution 21, in Norman Tanner (ed. and trans.), Decrees of the Ecumenical 
Councils 2 vols. (London, 1990), vol. 1, 245. 
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and exchange.59 Yet this narrowly conceived way of identifying ‘globalization’ takes a purely 
etic ‘world-systems’ perspective, obscuring the complex and strategic responses of Latin 
authorities, which served the demands of a very specific view of their society’s place in time 
and in human affairs. News spread rapidly of the attacks, but it was not until 1245 that a 
major Latin leader, Pope Innocent IV, attempted to communicate directly with the Mongols.60 
This was an especially precarious year for the papacy during a long-running struggle with the 
Holy Roman Empire. Innocent convened an ecumenical council, largely to assert papal 
supremacy against imperial claims: both directly, and by emphasising the importance of 
papal leadership in addressing other threats facing Christians. Around the same time, he 
launched an extensive evangelising enterprise to save souls before the world’s end, part of 
which involved dispatching envoys to the khan.61 Embassies were also sent around that time 
to the sultans of Syria and Egypt and the leaders of various Christian communities.62 The 
embassy to the Mongols was thus not principally a reaction to the attacks three years earlier, 
but related to internal politics. Although certainly aware of the immediate threat presented by 
                                               
59 Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System AD 1250-1350 
(New York, 1989). 
60 Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the West: 1221-1410 (Harlow, 2005), 58-134. 
61 On the timing, see: Jackson, Mongols, 87; ‘Vita Innocentii IV’, in Alberto Melloni, 
Innocenzo IV: La concezione e l’esperienza della cristianità come ‘regimen unius personae’ 
(Genoa, 1990), 269.. 
62 Jean Richard, La papauté et les missions d'Orient au Moyen Âge (XIIIe-XVe siècles) 
(Rome, 1977), esp. 45, 58-61. 
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the Mongols, the Council, too, considered that it was the danger to the Christian faith which 
was paramount.63 
 
The papal curia issued two encyclicals addressed to the Mongol khan and people, part of a 
series of statements that were designed to assert the authority of the papacy and the Roman 
church in a global context.64 They set out concisely the cosmological understanding of the 
Latin church, within which they positioned both the Mongol actions and the Latin response. 
One contained an account of the human condition and redemption through Christ, 
emphasising the authority and role of the pope ‘to gain all people for God’.65 The other 
reproached the Mongols for their violence and urged them to repent and make peace with 
God. Their significance and complexity can be missed if the identity of the envoys and their 
intended audiences are not understood. The envoys were friars chosen from among the 
Franciscans and Dominicans: orders recently instituted around a conscious reimagining of the 
lives and strategies of the original apostles in the service of contemporary ecclesiastical ends. 
Innocent explained that he had sent them, rather than high-ranking prelates, because the 
Mongols stood in grave need of pastoral guidance.66 This placed the Mongols within the 
                                               
63 Lyons I, constitution II.4 in Tanner (ed. and trans.), Decrees, vol. 1, 297. 
64 Karl-Ernst Lupprian, Die Beziehungen der Päpste zu islamischen und mongolischen 
Herrschern im 13. Jahrhundert anhand ihres Briefwechsels (Vatican, 1981), nos. 20, 21, 141-
9; James Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers and Infidels (Liverpool, 1979). 
65 [Authors’ translation.] Lupprian, Beziehungen, 144. 
66  Lupprian, Beziehungen, 149. 
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‘globalizing cosmology’ of the Latin West, obliterating any possibility of a rival cosmology. 
They could either conform to the truths set out for them, cease sinning, and become penitents 
under the guidance of Latin priests; or they could face damnation. Similar choices were being 
offered by inquisitors - albeit with more coercive force - to those in the Latin West who 
dissented from orthodox doctrine or practice. The letters to the khan were intended for a 
range of audiences including schismatic Christians and others encountered en route as well as 
the official recipients.67 Yet one could argue that the most important audience - the one most 
likely to be attentive to the positioning and the project - was internal, and that even this 
explicit attempt at ‘globalization’ through the conversion of the Mongols belonged to the 
wide-ranging work of societal ordering and governance; or, as the papacy would doubtless 
have put it, of ensuring the salvation of the faithful.68  
 
It was, then, the short-term imperatives generated by the shift and press of affairs, rather than 
the history of trade and exploration, that must be examined if we are to understand the uses of 
‘globalizing’ thought in the Latin West. Papal letters focusing on all aspects of the problems 
at hand, from an intransigent emperor, to the spread of heresy and the Mongol menace, were 
filled with a language of bleak eschatological urgency: imagery of Christians everywhere 
oppressed as kindness chilled and died in human hearts.69 This was a landscape of foreboding 
                                               
67 Giovanni di Pian di Carpini, ‘Historia mongalorum quos nos tartaros appellamus’, in Storia 
dei Mongoli, ed. Enrico Menestò et al (Spoleto, 1989), e.g. 306–7. 
68 R. I. Moore, The First European Revolution c. 970-1215 (London, 2000). 
69 Rebecca Rist, Papacy and Crusading in Europe 1198-1245 (London, 2009). 
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on a global scale, for there was no space free of the thickening gloom of the end-times, while 
the threat to Christianity was necessarily a threat to all human souls. At the same time, 
responsibility to address the situation was envisaged globally. The summons to the council 
called upon: ‘the kings of the earth, the prelates of the church and other princes of the 
world’.70 In the same vein, it was during these years that Innocent IV expanded the legal basis 
for papal jurisdiction over all human souls, not just Christians.71 This is, in many senses, a 
model of ‘extra-territorial or ‘cosmological’ globalization similar to the Aztecs’ all-
embracing world-view. Thus, what we have, in the letters to the khan, the documents of the 
council, and canon law, is a deliberate reworking and deployment of a globalizing 
cosmology, unifying various elements of medieval European belief. The strategies drew on 
centuries of experience, but were innovative and modern, responding to a powerful 
conjunction of political, social and theological issues. 
 
A ‘globalizing cosmology’ was far from the sole preserve of spiritual authorities. The 
thirteenth century was notable for the extent to which ideals of apostolicity permeated secular 
lordship. In most respects, Louis IX of France attained a spiritual power - confirmed later by 
his canonization - that far exceeded that of the politically embroiled popes of his day.72 Yet 
he sought to exercise this power through the same strategies as the pope and religious orders, 
using contemporary methods in pursuit of the old apostolic goals. The preparations for his 
                                               
70 Quoted in Tanner (ed. and trans.), Decrees, 273. 
71 Melloni, Innocenzo IV; Muldoon, Popes, 3-18, 29-48. 
72 See Jacques Le Goff, Saint Louis (Gallimard, 1996). 
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crusading endeavour of 1248-54 - during which he sent his own embassy to continue the 
efforts to convert the Mongols - included a programme of kingdom-wide moral and 
administrative reform.73 He employed the techniques of inquisitio to address corruption, 
while penitential processions and prayers from the whole people sought to secure God’s 
favour for victory.74 This was not solely a view imposed from above on a skeptical 
population: the news of his subsequent defeat and capture in Egypt led to rioting against 
religious authorities, whose perceived incompetence was blamed for the failure.75 On his 
return from the unsuccessful crusade, Louis undertook an even more vigorous regime of 
personal penance and moral reform of his subjects - recently characterized as ‘redemptive 
governance’.76 His approach was rooted in his society’s strong sense that everyday moralities 
affected global affairs. We find echoes of his conception of royal governance in the ambitions 
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and self-presentation of other secular rulers. Emperor Frederick II, despite his long periods of 
conflict with the papal curia, also attempted to draw potency from this pervasive global 
cosmology, presenting himself as the proper leader and protector of the faithful, in crusade, 
against the Mongols, and elsewhere.77 Here, the globalizing cosmology was deployed in a 
competitive arena, as Frederick sought to extend his conceptual and theoretical power beyond 
the borders of its effective influence.78 These political antagonisms only strengthened the 
ways in which Christianity constructed itself around a ‘globalizing’ vision: disputes over 
specific aspects of the ideology energized the narrative and underlined its importance. Elites 
were critical to the creation, promotion and maintenance of globalizing ideas, but also 
contested and manipulated them in order to appropriate cosmological authority.79 
 
Globalizing cosmologies were thus frequently hegemonic, and recorded normatively by 
almost-exclusively male elites, who could draw on them in an attempt to position their office 
and actions more securely. Yet such ‘global’ claims and gestures were given greater depth of 
meaning because their societies were profoundly committed to a shared cosmology. 
Globalizing ideas suffused the lives of individuals and communities, meaning that 
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(Toronto, 1964), 145-6. 
78 Franz Bosbach, ‘The European Debate on Universal Monarchy’, in David Armitage (ed.), 
Theories of Empire: 145-1800 (London, 1998), 81-98.  
79 On the construction of wider elite power, see Thomas N. Bisson (ed.), Cultures of Power: 
Lordship, Status, and Process in Twelfth-Century Europe (Pennsylvania, 1995). 
 195 
cosmologies were also negotiated, created and contested at other levels of society. In 
Tenochtitlan, as the city reflected the cosmos, so the household mirrored the city, and the city 
the household; the threads of the globalizing cosmology reached outward to the empire’s 
fringes, and inwards to the heart of the home.80 While the tlatoani fought to keep in balance 
the universal forces which swirled around him,81 women’s actions in the domestic sphere 
were also believed critical to maintaining the balance of the cosmos. Women were the 
guardians of hearthstones, symbol of the ‘Old God’ Huehueteotl, who was to be constantly 
appeased and supplied. With the women lay responsibility for caring for the revered maize: 
they blew softly on the grains before cooking to ‘mitigate’ their fear of the fire, and gathered 
dropped grains quickly to avoid divine displeasure leading to famine. The provision of food 
was a perilous activity: if a man ate a tamale which had been stuck to the cooking pot then he 
would fail on the battlefield: ‘the arrow which was shot would not find its mark’. And if that 
most archetypal of female implements, the metlatl (grinding stone), was broken then someone 
in the household was fated to die.82 Even the most ordinary acts had to be completed with an 
awareness of their global consequences. In the Latin West, women were also able to operate 
powerfully within a ‘global’ environment. Despite their exclusion from clerical roles, women 
often drew authority from following an apostolic way of life, which meant rejecting the 
pleasures and ties of the temporal sphere, in order to obtain access to the hidden world of 
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cosmic certainty which came only through dedication to God. Some joined religious orders, 
but many remained within their homes and communities, securing individual status and 
influence through their ability to call on the holy power that worked through prayer and the 
daily work of devotion, in some cases, producing revelatory visions or miracles.83 Their 
prayers of intercession were widely considered to have a transformative power in the lives 
and spiritual states of those around them as well as far further afield - on the wars and 
missions of the faithful. The layering of macro- and micro- is inescapable; globalizing 
cosmologies were negotiated, created and contested at every level of society. Although a 
globalizing cosmology was often expressed or experienced in relation to the ‘outside’ world 
its meaning was localized and subjective; its audience and purpose were often predominantly, 
although not exclusively, internal.  
 
We offer here ‘globalizing cosmologies’ as a challenge to monolithic, teleological ways of 
thinking about the ‘global’, and to the Eurocentric perspectives which often follow. The value 
of the ‘globalizing cosmology’ lies not in the way a society imagined its connections, its trade 
routes, but in its capacity to show the richness, variety and dynamism possible in ‘global’ 
thinking. There is an urgent need to think more provocatively and creatively; to develop more 
flexible and intellectually robust approaches to the questions of how, why and when 
communities conceive of themselves in global terms, and what we, as historians, can learn 
from being able to recognise and explore this strand in human thought. Understanding 
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something of how societies have structured and used globalizing thought in a variety of 
periods enables us to see, for example, how early modern European societies came to 
prioritize the acquisition of empirical information about commercial and colonial 
opportunities over a deeper and more-integrated understanding of the cosmos. The 
consequent focus on commercial activity has led, in both western history and historiography, 
to a blindness to alternative ways of understanding and exploring significance, leading to the 
very ‘narrow’ sense of the ‘global’ which we have identified. 
 
A ‘globalizing cosmology’ is a distinctive strategy for a society to adopt, but also one that, 
significantly, appears to be relatively common across recorded history. On the basis of the 
cases examined briefly here, we can see the close connections between globalizing thought 
and hegemonizing strategies. Complex cosmologies seem to be developed, articulated and 
widely disseminated as a way of legitimizing particular views of how a society should be 
organized and act, and at some points - ‘globalizing moments’, perhaps - injecting a sharp 
imperative into its affairs. They are effective precisely because they are ‘global’: they lay 
claim to all the space and time of humanity, consciously reducing or seeking to eliminate the 
legitimacy of alternative perspectives. The more successfully the cosmology can do this, the 
more effective it becomes as a way of describing, asserting, even policing, a society’s sense 
of what is normal and reasonable. As we have shown here, the concept of a ‘globalizing 
cosmology’ enables us to rethink our linear and binary sense of the ‘global’, broadening our 
understanding to encompass a greater diversity of societies and perspectives, and helping us 
guard against the sense that our own culture was at some point in the past static and inward-
looking, insulated from global dynamics. Paradoxically, globalizing cosmologies, although 
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frequently embedded in structures of conventional authority and hierarchy, potentially offer 
an important way to invert ‘global’ narratives and refocus them on previously marginalized 
histories. Such an approach might, for example, allow indigenous and colonized peoples to 
reimagine their own distinctive place in ‘global history’, rather than to see themselves as a 
peripheral player in Europe’s rise to world dominance.84  
 
There is nothing uniquely ‘medieval’ about a globalizing cosmology. These distinctive 
periods of engagement with ‘global’ thinking are experienced by societies throughout history 
and across the world. But it is our contention that what characterizes this particular 
‘globalizing’ tendency at any given point is not tied to the tropes of modernity: to 
communication, technology, trade, and cultural interaction or uniformity. Societies in all 
periods, including our own, have grappled with their place in the global cosmos and deployed 
that position for specific purposes: political, religious, cultural and economic. And a United 
States which valorizes its place as ‘leader of the free world’ may be deploying a ‘globalizing 
cosmology’ just as much as an Aztec state which saw itself as the beating heart of the known 
universe, the axis of the thirteen heavens and nine underworlds.  
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